The recent violent clashes between the followers of Dera Sacha Sauda (established in 1948 with its headquarters in Sirsa, Haryana) and different groups of Akalis as well as a spate of other social conflicts between Jats and Dalits in the state seem to have acquired an utmost importance in the current political history of Punjab. The importance of such conflicts surpases the much talked about ‘short-term politics of revenge’ and throws a critical light on their much deeper socio-religious roots steeped into the so-called casteless Sikh society in Punjab. On the one hand, it lay bare the dormant structures of social discrimination that permeates the fabric of the Sikh society and on the other, points towards the neo-conservative Sikhs’ anxiety of dwindling Sikh-Khalsa identity in the state. In fact, the recent Akalis-Dera Sacha Sauda row over the mimicking of iconography of the tenth Master of the Sikhs by Gurmeet Ram Raheem Singh, the current head of the Dera, seems much to do with the prevalence of the doctrinally rejected system of caste hierarchy among the Sikhs. Since majority of the followers of various Sacha Sauda type Deras come from the dispossessed sections of the society who at one point of time had embraced Sikhism in the hope of elevating their social status and fortune, their almost exodus from Sikhism towards alternative socio-spiritual space provided by such Deras invite the hostility of the clerics of the mainstream established religious order who interpret it as a serious challenge to the dwindling Sikh-Khalsa identity. Moreover, the frequent politicisation of the Deras makes the issue further complicated. The persistent attempts made by the various Sikh organizations during the recent Akalis-Dera crisis to win over their disgruntled Dalit Sikh followers are a clear case in point.
This paper intends to problematise the recent Akalis-Dera crisis by contextualising it into the larger Dalit question in Punjab and its implications for the religion based politics of the state. Punjab has the distinction of housing the country’s largest proportion of Scheduled Castes (SCs) population (29 per cent) belonging to different religions and castes. There are total of 38 castes among the SCs in the state. Out of these 38 castes, two belong to Sikh religion. The SCs who belong to Sikh religion are known as Mazhabi and Ramdasis or Ramdasia Sikhs. Mazhabis were Chuhras (sweepers) who converted first to Islam from Hinduism, and later to Sikhism. Ramdasias were Julahas (weavers) before their conversion to Sikhism. Ramdasia Sikhs are mostly confined to the Doaba and Malwa sub-regions of the state and majority of them are Sahajdhari Sikhs – those who do not observe the Khalsa outward manifestation. Kanshi Ram, founder of the Bhaujan Samaj Party (BSP), was a Ramdasia Sikh. Ramdasias are also known as Khalsa Biradar. Mazhabis, the devout Sikhs, are mostly concentrated in the Majha (between Beas ans Ravi Rivers) and Malwa (south of the Sutlej River, also known as Cis-Sutlej during the British period) sub-regions of Punjab – the battlefield of recent violent clashes between the Akalis and the Premis (literally lovers’, a traditional metaphor for devotees of the Sufi and Bhakti orders) of the Dera Sacha Sauda. It is also in the Malwa sub-region, the heartland of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), that the Dera Sacha Sauda turned the tables on the SAD by helping the beleagured congress win 37 out of its total 65 seats in the recent vidhan Sabha elections. In terms of numbers, Mazhabis are the most numerous Sikh caste among the SCs of Punjab (who account for 30.7 per cent of the total SC population in the state as per 19991 census), followed by Chamars (25.8 per cent), Ad Dharmis (15.9 per cent), Balmikis – Chuhras and Bhangis (11.1 per cent) to mention only the major castes. In the 2001 census their population was recorded at just a little over 22 lakhs (31 cent of the total SC population of the state). They are also the most deprived section of the SCs of Punjab with the lowest literacy rate (42.3 per cent) and majority of them are agricultural workers (52.2 per cent). Many of them have also been working as Siris (attached labourer). Though the Siri system has ceased to exist in the state, but in the Malwa region some of the Mazhabis still work as Siris. According to a field-based study of 26 villages in Malwa region, 21 had Dalits working as Siris.
Mazhabis embraced Sikhism in the hope of gaining social equality, but even in Sikhism the spectre of untouchability kept on haunting them. They “were forbidden to enter the Golden Temple for worship; their offering of karah prasad was not accepted and the Sikhs denied them access to public well and other utilities”. As late as 1920s they were not allowed to go beyond the fourth step in the Golden Temple and members of the upper castes were instructed not to mix with them. Evidence of untouchability against Dalit Sikhs is vividly reflected in a number of resolutions adopted by the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) from 1926-1933. Although the Sikh reformers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries preached in favour of removing untouchability, no strenuous efforts were made in that direction. Social opprobrium continues to afflict the Mazhabis and other Dalits. Some of them were of the opinion that Jats treat them as badly in the Gurdwaras as they treated them in their farmlands. In spite of their meticulous observance of Sikh religious principles, they are not considered equal by the dominant Sikh caste, which refused to associate with them, even in religious ceremonies. They continued to face discrimination in the Gurdwaras and are cremated on separate cremation grounds along with their Hindu counterparts. Even in some villages the land meant for the cremation grounds in the Shamlat (common land under the control of Panchayats) have been grabbed by the upper castes. They were also denied proportionate representation in various religious and local social structures in the state. It is the Jats, the dominant peasant caste in the state, who hegemonised over all the Sikh organizations: Gurdwaras, Sikh Deras, SGPC, and SAD. Dalits are often heard of complaining that if Jats refused to consider them equal even after deaths by denying them the right to burn in a common cremation ground then why should they expect from us that we should continue with their mainstream (read Sikh) religion. This has forced the Dalit Sikhs to establish separate Gurdwaras that strengthened the already existing caste divisions among the Sikhs. Caste divisions get further reinforced in the segregated lives that Dalits live in away from the mainstream villages. Their settlements are contemptuously called Thhattis or Chamarlees. Thhattis or Chamarlees are invariably located on the side toward which the sewerage of villages flows. Madanjeet Singh observes “Notwithstanding the media images of Punjab’s prosperity, the region has become the ghetto of caste apartheid”.
It is against this backdrop of blatant social exclusion that a large number of Dalits have been veering away from the mainstream Sikh religion and enrolling themselves into various forms of Deras in Punjab whose success partly “lies in the relationship between Dalit resistance and religious rebellion”. Of late, the Dalits of Punjab have mustered enough strength to challenge the dominant caste and its exclusive hold on the mainstream Sikhism. At least from among the Mazhabis and Ramdasias Sikhs, “a strand of thought has begun to emerge that rebels against the exclusionist and reactionary tendencies that have continued to linger contrary to the mission and ideas of the gurus”. In fact, it was the Mazhabis and Ramdasias who constituted the core of the ‘Bhaniarawala phenomenon’ and the ‘Talhan crisis’ respectively. Again it was the Mazhabis and Ramdasias Sikhs of the Malwa region of the Punjab who figured most in the Sacha Sauda crisis recently. Another probable cause behind the large-scale Dalit followings of the Deras in Punjab could be the absence of a strong Dalit movement of the sort of the famous Ad Dharm led by legendary Babu Mangoo Ram Mugowalia during the first half of the 20th century. Had the Ad Dharm movement continued in full swing, it could have curtailed the swift flow of the Dalits towards the mushrooming growth of the Deras in Punjab? In fact, it could have even precluded the emergence of such a large number of Deras. In the absence of a strong Dalit movement and with the emergence of caste structures within the Sikh organizations despite the clear Panthic strictures against it, Dalits were but helpless to seek refuge in those organistions and Deras that promise them social equality and dignity.
However, the phenomenon of Deras is not new to Punjab. Rather it was as old as the very process of the evolution of the Sikh faith. Different sects and Deras that emerged at different intervals during the evolution of the mainstream Sikh religion were primarily the outcome of the disgruntled and unsuccessful attempts of the fake claimants to the title of Guru. Bidhi Chand, the dissenter, made first such an attempt during the Guru-period (1552-1574) of third Guru, Amar Dass. He formed the Handalis sect, instituted the worship of Niranjan, ‘the bright God’ and declared himself as the Prophet or Handal. The Handalis endulged in anti-Panthic activities and collaborated with “Muslims in the destruction of Sikh properties and documents. They were penalized and dispossessed by Ranjit Singh, the first Maharajah of the Sikh Empire”. During the fifth Guru-period of Arjan Dev (1581-1606), Dhirmaliye and Mine sects were organized in opposition to the main religious Sikh body and they established their Deras along the Sutlej River. These sects were led by no else a person than by the elder brother (Prithi Chand) of Guru Arjan Dev himself, who also claimed to be Guru. Massandis was another sect that also cropped up during the Guruship of Arjan Dev. The Massandis (from the Masand exogamous gotra of the Khatri trading caste) were personal agents of Guru Arjan who he employed for collecting the offerings for the annual assembly of Sikhs. Later on when they indulged in the anti-Panthic activities, the Guru denounced them publicly. The descendants of Ram Rai, son of the Guru Har Rai (1644-1661), also organized a sect known as Ramraiyas during the Gurus-period. They dissented against the main body of the Sikhs, built a Dera at Dehra Dun (Uttar Pradesh) and attributed Guruship to Ram Rai. Apart from these early sects and Deras of the Gurus times, there were many more sects and Deras that cropped up at different intervals on the long and tortuous journey of the consolidification of the Sikh religion. Some of the more prominent among them were Nanakpanthis, Udasis, Sewapanthis, Nirmalas and the Nihangs also known as Akalis or Shahids. What distinguished the contemporary Deras from their counterparts during the Guruship period of the ten Masters is that in the case of the former their founders were/are not related to the Gurus of the mainstream Sikh body nor they claim Guruship over and above the ten Masters. Even in the recent case of Dera Sacha Sauda crisis, its chief had to render a written apology for mimicking the iconography of the tenth Master. However, one factor that seems to draw a similarity between the earlier and the contempopary Derasd is the presence of the institution of Human Guruship in all of them that goes against the very basic spirit and tenets of mainstream Sikhism.
According to a latest study conducted by the Desh Sewak, a daily published from Chandigarh, there would be more than 9 thousand of such Deras in the total 12 thousand villages of Punjab. Among them the most popular Deras are of Radha Soamis sect, Sacha Sauda, Nirankaris, Namdharis, Divya Jyoti Sansthan, Bhaniarawala, and Ravidasis. Almost all of them have their branches in all the districts of the state and in other states of the country as well. Some of them are very popular among the Punjabi Diasporas and have overseas branches in almost all the continents of the world. These Deras claim to be only spiritual organizations and deny formulating any new religion. They said to believe in the oneness of God and do not adhere to a particular faith, though the heads of some of them (Sacha Sauda and Radha Soamis) wear turban and has long beard in the Sikh style. People belonging to various religions like Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, Christianity etc can become their members and they need not to relinquish their previous religious identities. Despite their non-sectarian claims some of these Deras are adhered to along caste lines. There is a close connection between the memerbership of some of them and the particular caste groups. “When some caste members are persuaded to join a particular sect offering certain advantages, usually in terms of upward mobility, others of the same caste may also follow. In some cases, of course, the factor of hereditary descent or assumed hereditary descent from the founder of the sect is involved. Namdharis, Bhaniarawala and Ravidasis Deras are of special interest in that they mostly draw on the affliations of those caste groups to which the founders of these sects belonged. In the case of the Namdharis, it was primarily members of the Ramgharia caste, actually a section of the Tarkhan Sikh caste, who were part of this sect. Bhaniarawala Deras are strongholds of the Mazhabis. In the Ravidasis Deras, again a very large majority of their followers belonged to the two main castes – Chamars and Ad Dharmis – of the Dalits in Punjab.
There is a general impression that 80 per cent of the people of Punjab are affiliated with one or the other type of Deras. These Deras can be categorised into Sikh and non-Sikh ones. The non-Sikh Deras (like Sacha Sauda, Radha Soamis, Divya Joyti, Nirankaris, Bhaniarawala) enjoy a large number of followings among the Dalits [SCs and Other Backward Castes (OBCs)] in the state. Thereby, these Deras are also called Dalit Deras. About 70 per cent followers of Sacha Sauda are Dalits. Among its upper caste devotees a large number come from landless farmers or small time cultivators and shopkeepers who feel alienated by the powerful and moneyed leaders of Sikh organizations such as the SGPC. Among the followers of the Radha Soamis sect the estimated strength of the Dalits is more than 50 per cent and majority of them hail from Dalit concentrated districts of Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Nawanshahr, and Hoshiarpur of the Doaba sub-region of Punjab. Similarly among the Deras of the Divya Jyoti Sansthan headed by Ashutosh the participation of the Dalits is much more in comparison to that of the upper castes. The vast majority of the followers of Nirankaris also come from the non-Jats city dwellers castes. Namdhari Deras attract a large number of its followers from the Ramgarhia community – originally Tarkhan (carpenter) caste, a Backward Caste in Punjab.
As far as Jats are concerned majority of them are the followers of Sikh Deras.It is generally believed that almost all the Sikh Deras are headed invariably by Jat Sikhs. It is rare that the head of a Sikh Dera would be a non-Jat Sikh. Even if there would be one he could not be a Dalit at all. At most Dalit Sikhs participation in Sikh Deras is confined only to the narration of the Sikhs’ sacred texts and performing of Kirtan (musical rendering of sacred hymns). Those who perform Kirtan are known as Raagis, and the professional narrators of the sacred texts who read it in a stylized manner are popularly known as Granthis. Majority of the Raagis and Granthis are Dalit Sikhs. Very few Jat Sikhs take up such professions. Bhai Mardana, a Marassi (lower caste), used to play the rabab (musical instrument) for Guru Nanak, the first Master of the founder of the Sikh faith. In the Sikh Deras, Sikh code of coduct is strictly followed and only Gurubani of Guru Granth Sahib is recited. Whereas in the non-Sikh Deras though Gurubani from Guru Granth Sahib is recited but at the same time other sacred texts are also referred to. In non-Sikh Deras idol worship and devotion towards human Guru is not an anathema like that in Sikh theology. It is precisely due to the presence of such non-Sikh traditions (human Guruship) in such Deras that the phenomenon of non-Sikh Deras came to be known what Meeta and Rajivlochan call ‘alternate guru movement in Punjab’.
This ‘alternate guru movement in Punjab’ with its ‘loose syncretistic practices’ throws a formidable challenge to Sikh-Khalsa identity separate from the Hindu. For the neo-conservative Sikhs the Sikh-Khalsa identity has always been under a challenge and is particularly locked in an existential struggle with its two main adversaries: modernity and apostasy. Modernity is considered to be corrupting the young Sikhs who become lackadaisical in their observance of the Khalsa principles advocated by the tenth Master. Though Bhindranwala tried to assert the Sikh-Khalsa identity by taking up cudgel with a dissident sect of the Nirankaris and preaching hatred against the Hindus, but that could not preclude the move of the Dalits towards non-Sikh Deras. These Deras, in fact, pose a more serious challenge to the mainstream Sikhism. It is argued that Dalit Sikhs’ desertion of the Panth and their entry into various non-Sikh Deras is directly related to the over all control of Jats on the various Panthic organizations. Since all the important Sikh/Panthic organizations are under the conrol of the Jats and they are adamant not to share their management with Dalits, Dalits were forced to build their own separate religious organizations or to take refuge in non-Sikh Deras in the state. The followings of these Deras seem to far exceed that of the Golden Temple-based clerical establishment.
It is in this context that confrontration between Deras and the mainstream Sikhism assumes great significance. These Deras, in fact, represent the disillusions of the dispossessed who at one point of time in their life embraced Sikhism in order to escape the taint of untouchability that was adhered to them in the Hindu social order. However, since their conversion into Sikhism failed to liberate them from the scar of the untouchabilty, they turn towards no-Sikh Deras that offer them perhaps better place. In other words the entry of Dalit Sikhs into various non-Sikh Deras in Punjab represent their social dissent and disillusionment with the Sikh religion Their social dissent propels them to seek a sense of personal worth by getting enrolled into one or other of such Deras. The dynamics of dissent and seeking personal worth through affliations with the Deras is what that made these Deras very popular and consequently brought them into steep confrontation with the long established mainstream Sikh religion in Punjab.
In a recent case of confrontation between the Akalis and the Premis of the Dera Sacha Sauda, the Akalis tried to suppress the dissent through the use of violence and with the help of the state machinery. The Akalis also tried to win back some of their lost followers to the Dera Sacha Sauda, as most newspapers have reported, through forceful re-coversion. But social dissent cannot be simply wiped out either by re-conversion or by the sheer use of force legitimate or otherwise. Forceful suppression of social dissent rather turns it more aggressive. The very Sikh religion is a case in point. It rose in opposition to the rotten evils of caste and gender discrimination, and mindless religious persecution. The dispossessed soon joined its ranks. Untold atrocities against the Gurus and their followers failed to dampen its spirit. Instead, it got further strengthened. However, of late the evil of caste system against which it launched a tirade became its achilles’ heel. The sheen of its egalitarian agenda started becoming dim. It is at this juncture that the non-Sikh Deras enters into socio-religious territories of Punjab. They took on the same agenda of egalitarianism rather more vigorously that used to be an integral part of Sikhism in its pre Misl period. The promise of true egalitarianism pushed both Hindu and Sikh Dalits towards these Deras who feel alienated by the apartheid that pervaded rural Punjab. Since majority of their followers belonged to Dalits of different nomenclatures, these Deras came to be identified alongwith the traditional caste divisions in the state. It seems that all the non-Sikh deras are known as Dalit Deras and the Sikh Deras are called Jat Deras. Thus, it is safe to say that caste underscores the very composition of the various Sikh as well as non- Sikh Deras in Punjab. Thus the real bone of contention in the recent clashes between Akalis of various nomenclatures and the Premis of the Dera Sacha Sauda in Punjab is not just over religion, but caste, which exploded the myth of casteless Sikh society in the state on the one hand and challenged the hegemony of the Sikh-Khalsa identity on the other.
The violent clashes in Punjab are more about identity confrontation between Jats (a former marginal community that has successfully overcomed its lower social status) and Dalits (a contemporary marginal community that failed miserably to do the same). They, in fact, reveal what the Dalits seems to have been struggling for over the last few decades in the contemporary Punjab, probably used to bother the Jats also earlier in the state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, what makes the case of the Jats as an ex-marginal community rather different from that of the Dalits was their being a clean Shudra and free from the taint of untouchability. On the contrary, Dalits were known as unclean shudras whose very touch and sigh were considered to be polluting precisely because of their occupational closeness to the polluting articles. Another factor that might have helped the Jats to overcome their lower status was their corporate social mobility affected through their group conversion into Sikh religion. Moreover yet another factor that might have helped them improve their social status was the absence of sharp contradictions between them and the then upper caste community of the Khatris in the state. Khatris, unlike Jats in the case of social mobility of Dalits, did not oppose the Jats in their attempts towards upward social mobility. On the contrary, the impoving socio-economic position of the Jats perhaps suited Khatris the most in their commercial interests.
However, in contemporary Punjab Dalits find themselves in quite different situation from that of the Jats duing the formative period of their social mobility. First of all, Dalits’ case differs clearly from that of the Jats in the sense that major gap lies between the ‘shudra’ status of the Dalits and that of the Jats. Though Jats were considered Shudras and lower Vaishyas in the medieval times, their social ranking was still much higher in comparision to that of the Dalits who were further pushed down on the social scale of the Hindu caste hierarchy. Jats were Shudras because of their profession, so were the Dalits. But the profession (agriculture) of the Jats was placed on a higher scale in the Hindu caste hierarchy in comparision to that of the Dalits, who were considered polluted as well as polluting because of their professional closeness to the carrion, human excreta and leatherwork. Enough references are available in the literatures on social mobility indicating the importance assigned to the profession of agriculture for uplifting the status of the marginalized groups. So much so that some of the Dalits opted for agricultural labour work in order to escape the social taint caused by their polutted professions. Thus inspite of the Jats and Dalits being both Shudras they belonged to two different status groups within the same broader category (Shudras) in the Hindu social hierarchy.
The Jats of Punjab are primarily an agriculture community. There is no consensus among the scholars about their origins and social rankings. However, they were considered to be egalitarian in their social dealings among themselves. Social hierarchies were alien to them. So was the gender discrimination. They were neither artisans nor menials. Since they were primarily first pastoral and then agriculturalists, they cannot surely be clubbed together with the categories of the artisans and the menials who were distinctly characterized by the ancillary nature of their hereditary professions to agriculture. Jats were also known as pagans who fall beyond the pale of the Hindu religion. Their placement within the Varna system is also disputed. Since every profession that involves physical work is generally consigned into a lower status within the Brahminical Social Order (BSO), the profession of agriculture was not an exception. In fact, in the BSO polughing was considered to be below the status of the upper castes. An upper caste often prefers to die of starvation than to touch the plough that lowers his social status in the rigid caste hierarchy. The fourth Varna (the lowest), popularly known as Shudra, consisted primarily of the artisan and the menial castes. Similarly there is no doubt about the profile of the first (priest), second (soldiers), and the third (traders) Varnas. However, as far as Jats (agricultural caste) were concerned they were not clearly categorized in the Varna order. Their erstwhile social exclusion was based more on the unique social traditions and customs that they followed than on the polluting nature of their profession. Another factor that made the life of the Dalits further miserable was the fact that they were deprived of land ownership. So in an agrarian economy they were forced to depend for their livelihood by working on the land of some one else. That posited them in direct confrontation with the Jats – the dominant land owning caste in Punjab. Unlike the case of Jats versus Khatris in the eighteenth century, the Dalits in contemporary Punjab are entangled with the Jats in a face-to-face contradiction in the sector of agriculture. Their relationship with the Jats is that of landlords versus landless agricultural workers. Despite their largest proportion in the population of the state in the country (29 percent [2001 census]), they own just 2.34 percent share in the agricultural land, the lowest in the country. Their share in the trade, industry, financial sector, health, and religious establishments in the state is also almost negligible. It is in this context that the Jats (the landholders), and the Dalits (the landless agricultural workers) find themselves in a situation of direct confrontation.
However, there are many Dalits in the state who have improved their economic conditions by dissociating from their caste occupations and distancing them from the profession of agriculture. They have strengthened their economic position through sheer hard work and enterprise. Although the constitutional affirmative action played an important role in the upliftment of the Dalits in general, the monopoly of the Punjabi Dalits of the leather business in the famous Boota Mandi in the Doaba sub-region of the state and their ventures abroad turned out to be of crucial importance in overcoming their economic hardships. Some of them have established their own small-scale servicing units [carpentry, barber, blacksmith shops etc. In addition, they have also been politicized to a large extant by the socio-political activities of the famous Ad Dharm movementand of the various Ravidass Deras (religious centers dedicated to the teachings and philosophy of Guru Ravidass). In this case they have not only improved their economic status, but have also liberated themselves from the subordination of the Jat landowners. Consequently, their improved economic circumstances propelled them to aspire for a commensurate social status, which they seek through their memberships of the alternate non-Sikh Deras.
Thus armed with the weapon of improved economic conditions and sharpened social consciousness, the Dalits in Punjab mustered enough strength to ask for a concomitant rise in their social status. They also turn towards various Deras that help them in seeking new and respectable social identity they are terribaly in need of. However, the Jats interpreted such Dalit assertion as a challenge to their long established supremacy in the state and also to their Sikh-Khalsa identity that in turn sharpened the contradictions between them and the Dalits. This has led to a series of violent caste conflicts between the Dalits and the Jats in Punjab over the last few years. Such conflicts are in no way a manifestation of communalism in the state. They are, In fact, signs of emerging Dalit assertion, which has all the possibilities of snowballing into a serious violent conflict.